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EVERYTHING IN ITS RIGHT PLACE: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE BANKRUPTCY FRAUD EXCEPTION 
William Miller 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Language cannot exist without ambiguity. Throughout history, 
ambiguous language has been both a burden and a boon on the ability to 
effectively communicate ideas and expressions. On one hand, ambiguity 
is an obstacle that can either distort or jettison any rational meaning 
from a sentence. On the other hand, ambiguity is essential to any 
language. If languages are too exact and well-defined, to the point that 
that every word possesses only one meaning, it would be nearly 
impossible to communicate complex concepts. 
In the legal field, ambiguity serves a similar double-edged role. 
Statutes and laws without clear meaning make it difficult for citizens, 
especially those without any legal knowledge, to understand permissible 
and impermissible behavior. However, indoctrinated in criminal law is 
the rule of lenity, which requires the ambiguities in criminal statutes to 
be resolved in favor of the defendant.1 As evidenced by the legal 
concept of lenity, ambiguity has a prolific history within the legal field, 
and ambiguity serves as a crux for the analysis of this Article. 
Recently, the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in the case of In re Appling, to interpret two sections of the Bankruptcy 
Code regarding the nondischargeability of debt based on false pretenses 
or representation, actual fraud, or false financial statements.2 There is a 
widening split among circuit courts as to the proper interpretation of 11 
U.S.C. § 532(a)(2), which stems from inconsistent interpretation of the 
provision. Courts have reached conflicting interpretations of a statement 
respecting the debtor’s or insider’s financial condition.3 Determining the 
appropriate interpretation is key to deciding whether certain statements, 
though fraudulently expressed, are dischargeable under the Bankruptcy 
 
 1. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 n. 8 (2004) (indicating the rule of lenity should be 
applied as a last resort of statutory construction, so long as not contrary to legislative intent). 
 2. In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017); Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 
S. Ct. 1752 (2018). 
 3. In re Bogdanovich, 292 F.3d 104, 112–113 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting language from 11 U.S.C. 
§ 532(a)(2)). See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2): discharge under this title does not discharge a debt in the form 
of money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained 
by—(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the 
debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition; (B) use of a statement in writing—(i) that is materially false; 
(ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition; (iii) on which the creditor to whom the 
debtor is liable for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and (iv) that the debtor 
caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.  
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Code. In In re Appling, the Eleventh Circuit attributed too broad of an 
interpretation to §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) when determining whether a 
statement about a single asset was a “statement respecting the debtor’s 
financial condition.”4 In analyzing In re Appling, the Supreme Court 
should apply a narrower interpretation as was done by the Fifth Circuit 
in the case In re Bandi.5  
Part II of this Article provides background information pertaining to 
the development of the federal Bankruptcy Code and its purpose. 
Additionally, the section focuses on the bankruptcy process and the role 
discharge plays; discussing both the role and policy of discharges and 
more specifically the roles and policy of the fraud exception. Finally, 
Part II distinguishes §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) to shed light on their 
meaning and applicability. Part III compares the courts’ decisions in In 
re Appling and In re Bandi, analyzing the courts’ rationales and 
interpretations. The section also compares decision theories to predict 
the Supreme Court’s ultimate assessment on the circuit split. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was the first federal law Congress 
passed related to bankruptcy.6 Comparable to many state bankruptcy 
systems at the time, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was creditor-oriented 
and only allowed involuntary bankruptcies for merchant debtors, those 
who incur debt through commercial transactions.7 In 1898, Congress 
passed a bankruptcy law that became essentially permanent, though it 
has been amended and replaced multiple times since its introduction.8 
Subsequent subsections of this Article will trace the current Bankruptcy 
Code’s development, including Congress’ recognition to modernize 
bankruptcy law, including a brief synopsis of the legislative history. 
Following the Bankruptcy Code’s development, this Article will 
examine different theories behind the current code, including the 
debtor’s “fresh start.” Discussion then focuses on the role of discharge 
of debts in bankruptcy, and finally concentrates on the fraud exceptions 
to discharge found in 11 U.S.C. § 523. 
 
 4. Appling, 848 F.3d at 961 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).  
 5. In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 6. David Haynes, History of Bankruptcy in the United States, THE BALANCE (Apr. 29, 2018), 
https://www.thebalance.com/history-of-bankruptcy-in-the-united-states-316225. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
2
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A. Bankruptcy Code’s Development 
In 1970, Congress created the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission, to recommend changes to the bankruptcy laws established 
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.9 The Commission was tasked with 
“considering the basic philosophy of bankruptcy, its causes, possible 
alternatives to the present system of bankruptcy administration, the 
applicability of advanced management techniques to administration of 
the Act, and such other matters as the Commission should deem relevant 
to its assigned mission.”10  
Legislation based on the Commission’s report was introduced in both 
the Senate and House in 1973.11 After years of hearings, rather different 
bills, H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 were introduced, neither of which bore a 
close resemblance to the Commission’s draft.12 Following nearly a 
decade of study and deliberation, President Carter signed the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 into law on November 6, 1978.13 The 
law took effect October 1, 1979, with some of the provisions, 
particularly those affecting bankruptcy courts, phased in over a five-year 
transition period.14 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 favored 
protection for the rights of consumer debtors by encouraging greater use 
of the Chapter 13 mode of relief allowing for the restructuring of debts 
of individuals with regular income.15 The hope was that creditors would 
be paid more in Chapter 13 and that debtors would emerge with better 
credit.16 
B. Bankruptcy’s Purpose 
Bankruptcy law sprouted a spirited discourse concerning its 
theoretical origins, which remains largely unsettled.17 Perhaps this is 
 
 9. S.J. Res. 88, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).  
 10. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, The Commission: Its History and Process (Nov. 
26, 1997), (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 1 (1973)). 
 11. Charles E. Andersen, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, HG, 
https://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=19818. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1997–1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong. 
(1997–1978). 
 12. Anderson, supra note 11. 
 13. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 5, 34 (1995). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 35. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1326 (where the Chapter 13 bankruptcy payment plan is 
discussed. Chapter 13 bankruptcy enables debtors with regular income to retain their assets and develop 
a plan to repay all or part of their debts, typically over a three to five year period).  
 16. Tabb, supra note 13, at 35. 
 17. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 5 (7th ed. 2014). 
3
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because bankruptcy varies for consumer debtors and business debtors in 
its operation and outcome. In the consumer realm, many, if not most, 
American theorists accept that bankruptcy is largely about a “fresh start” 
for the individual debtor.18 Most frequently, people equate the “fresh 
start” with the economic rehabilitation of debtors through bankruptcy’s 
discharge of debt.19 This economic theory of the fresh start advocates a 
contractual approach to bankruptcy; the fresh start operates with an 
insurance-like function of bankruptcy’s discharge.20 Other theorists posit 
morality-based grounds of the discharge, observing the deep-seated 
norm of forgiveness in many western cultures.21 Regardless of the 
theoretical underpinnings behind the concept, most theorists believe 
consumer bankruptcy is about the fresh start. The idea is that the fresh 
start allows former debtors to earn, spend, borrow, and repay money at a 
manageable pace.22  
Business bankruptcy, at least from a creditor’s perspective, addresses 
the problem of the “common pool,” which is the difficulty of acting 
collectively and cooperatively to maximize the value of a debtor’s assets 
(and thus the creditor’s aggregate return).23 Put simply: creditors who 
take individual action to recoup their debts may back the debtor into a 
situation—going out of business—where he cannot work at all. 
Consequently, the debtor will no longer have wage income. The result 
being, the creditors recover less from the debtor through the bankruptcy 
process.24 A number of scholars argue that bankruptcy law reflects an 
enormous complex of conflicting social and economic goals that cannot 
be over simplified.25 Among these conflicting goals is the idea that 
creditor’s interests are prioritized above those of owners of the business 
or its employees.26 
One point is conceded by all: a major goal of bankruptcy is to 
 
 18. Id. at 6 (quoting language used by the Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 
(1934)). 
 19. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, supra note 10, at 73–74. 
 20. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 219 
(2004). 
 21. Warren et al., supra note 17; see, e.g. Heidi M. Hurd & Ralph Brubaker, Debts and the 
Demands of Conscience: The Virtue of Bankruptcy (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming). 
 22. Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL 
L. REV. 67, 68 (2006). 
 23. Warren, supra note 17 at 7. 
 24. See generally Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in 
Corporate Reorganization, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 653, 2013 
(describing the collective action problem in corporate Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings). 
 25. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 
(1993). 
 26. Warren et al., supra note 17. 
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preserve value.27 Bankruptcy preserves economic value through 
liquidation and reorganization.28 The collective approach to orderly asset 
liquidation is typically more value-preserving than the seizure and sale 
by a group of competing creditors.29 Reorganization bankruptcy 
preserves the “going concern” value of ongoing business, reflecting the 
economic fact that businesses, like people, are often worth more alive 
than dead.30 
C. Bankruptcy and the Role of Discharges 
As noted earlier, the bankruptcy process, while the same in some 
respects, differs for a consumer debtor filing and for a business debtor 
filing, and differs depending upon the chapter under which the debtor 
chooses to file.31 The focus of this Article is not on the bankruptcy 
process itself, however, having a basic understanding is important to 
comprehending this Article’s focus. Consequently, this Article provides 
a general description of bankruptcy and its processes.  
There is a bankruptcy court for each judicial district in the country, 
with a total of ninety bankruptcy districts across the country.32 The 
procedural aspects of the process are governed by the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) as well as local rules of 
each bankruptcy court.33  
The bankruptcy process balances two principal concerns.34 First, it 
seeks to relieve an overburdened debtor from “oppressive” debt through 
discharge.35 Secondly, it organizes the debtor’s assets so that they may 
be fairly apportioned among creditors with claims against the debtor.36 
A bankruptcy case begins when the debtor files a petition with the 
bankruptcy court in the jurisdiction in which he or she resides.37 The 
debtor must provide financial information, including a list of assets, 
debts, and creditors.38 Once the debtor files the bankruptcy petition, an 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. United States Courts, Process – Bankruptcy Basics, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Warren et al., supra note 17. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 
91 YALE LJ. 857, 857 (1982).  
 37. Rebecca L. Saitta, Overview of the Bankruptcy Process, 59 VIRGINIA LAWYER 38, 38 (June 
2010), http://www.vsb.org/docs/valawyermagazine/vl0710_bk-overview.pdf.  
 38. Id. 
5
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automatic stay takes effect, which bars debt collection efforts against the 
debtor, unless otherwise permitted by the bankruptcy court.39 The 
debtor’s creditors are notified of the filing and the court appoints a 
trustee to oversee the administration of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.40  
The bankruptcy estate is a deliberately expansive concept that 
includes all property owned by the debtor, with few exceptions set forth 
in the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).41 In Chapter 7 cases, the debtor 
will usually obtain an order discharging most of his or her debts within 
three to four months.42 Chapter 13 cases typically require expenditures 
to creditors over numerous years before a debtor will obtain an order 
discharging his or her debts.43 
As discussed previously, the Bankruptcy Commission’s findings in 
1973 summarized the prevailing view: “bankruptcy should rehabilitate 
debtors for continued and more value-productive participation in 
economic life.”44 The Code implements the debtor rehabilitation policy 
through its discharge provisions.45 The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a 
broad discharge, which provides a fresh start to “honest but unfortunate 
debtors.”46 The bankruptcy discharge releases the debtor from personal 
liability of the debts specified within applicable provisions. In other 
words, the debtor no longer has an obligation to pay debts that are 
judicially determined to be discharged.47 The discharge is a permanent 
directive barring creditors from engaging in any collection efforts 
against the discharged debts, including legal action and communication 
with the debtor.48 In Chapter 7 cases, the debtor does not have an 
 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (§ 362 codifies the automatic stay; notable exceptions of the automatic stay 
include: 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) of the collection of domestic support obligations from property that is 
not property of the estate; § 362(b)(2)(F) of the interception of a tax refund, as specified in applicable 
sections of the Social Security Act; § 362(b)(2)(G) of the enforcement of a medical obligation, as 
specified under title IV of the Social Security Act). 
 40. Saitta, supra note 37. 
 41. Warren et al., supra note 17 (referencing 11. U.S.C. § 541, which includes a set of policy-
based exceptions for employee contributions to retirement accounts and services performed by an 
individual debtor after commencement of the case—based on the fresh start concept). 
 42. Saitta, supra note 37. 
 43. Id. (Again, this is not a comprehensive insight into the bankruptcy process, it is simply an 
overview of the discharge of a debtor’s debt as an integral and compelling part of the bankruptcy 
process). 
 44. National Bankruptcy Review Commission, supra note 10. 
 45. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (Chapter 7 discharges). See 11 U.S.C. § 1228 (Chapter 12 discharges); 
11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Chapter 13 discharges). 
 46. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 47. United States Courts, Discharge in Bankruptcy – Bankruptcy Basics, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcy-
bankruptcy-basics. 
 48. Id.  
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absolute right to a discharge.49 A creditor, the trustee, or the U.S. trustee 
may file an objection to the debtor’s discharge.50 A creditor must file a 
complaint in the bankruptcy court to object to the debtor’s discharge.51 
Filing a complaint objecting a debtor’s discharge is referred to in 
bankruptcy as an “adversary proceeding.”52 
D. The Fraud Exception § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(2)(B) 
The debts discharged vary under each chapter of the Code.53 Section 
523(a) of the Code specifically excepts different classifications of debts 
from the discharge allowed to individual debtors.54 Meaning, the debtor 
is not allowed the liberation of certain debts, but instead must repay 
them to his or her creditors. Congress determined that certain types of 
debt are not dischargeable for public policy reasons, either because of 
the nature of the debt or because the debt was incurred due to improper 
behavior.55 Generally, the exceptions to discharge automatically apply if 
the language of § 523(a), the focus of the remainder of this Article, 
applies.56 However, the debts described in §§ 523(a)(2), (4), and (6)—
debts affected by fraud or maliciousness—are not automatically 
excepted from discharge.57 Instead, creditors must initiate an adversary 
proceeding to have the court determine whether the relevant debt may 
be excepted from discharge.58 
Due to the nature and philosophy of Bankruptcy law, the exceptions 
to dischargeability should be construed strictly, with the creditor bearing 
the burden to prove the exception.59 This theory of strict interpretation is 
 
 49. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (whereby a debtor can lose his ability to discharge debts for a 
variety of reasons. For example, § 727(a)(3) when the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, 
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, 
and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, 
unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case). 
 50. Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 47.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Appling, 848 F.3d at 955. 
 53. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727; 11 U.S.C. § 1228; 11 U.S.C. § 1328. 
 54. Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 47. 
 55. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (“A discharge . . . of this title does not discharge an individual 
debtor from any debt for death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle, 
vessel, or aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated from using alcohol, 
a drug, or another substance.” Clearly, the legislative intent behind this exception was to disallow 
debtors from discharging debts incurred through felonious operation of vehicles that cause the death or 
injury of others.). 
 56. Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 47. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003.  
 59. In re Hunter, 780 F.2d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 
(1915); In re Danns, 558 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
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rational, considering the courts progression towards allowing a fresh 
start to “honest but unfortunate debtors.”60 However, courts have not 
always applied a strict interpretation; the court in this Article’s primary 
case, In re Appling, interpreted § 523 broadly.61 
The fraud exception does not allow the discharge of a debt obtained 
by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a 
statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.”62 
Which is to say, a debt obtained fraudulently is not dischargeable, unless 
the fraudulent statement “respects” the debtor’s (or insider’s63) financial 
condition.64 Also excepted from discharge is a debt obtained by use of a 
written statement that is “materially false; respecting the debtor’s or an 
insider’s financial condition; on which the creditor to whom the debtor 
is liable for [debt] reasonably relied; and that the debtor caused to be 
made or published with the intent to deceive.”65 
The Code treats debts incurred by a statement “respecting the debtor’s 
. . . financial condition” differently from other debts.66 All fraud “other 
than a statement respecting a debtor’s . . . financial condition” is covered 
by subsection (A),67 meaning that a debtor cannot discharge a debt 
obtained by any type of fraudulent statement, oral or written.68 But, if a 
statement is made in writing “respecting the debtor’s . . . financial 
condition,” then subsection (B) governs.69 To prevent discharge of a 
debt induced by a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, 
a creditor must show: (1) reasonable reliance; (2) the statement was 
intentional, materially false; and (3) the statement is in writing.70 
Accordingly, a debt obtained by a fraudulent oral statement respecting 
the debtor’s financial condition can be discharged in bankruptcy.71 
One purpose of the fraud exception to discharge is to rebuke the 
debtor for engaging in fraudulent conduct, under the belief that the 
debtor’s dishonesty necessitates punishment.72 The reasons for 
punishing the dishonest debtor differ, but some theorists suggest 
 
 60. See Appling, 848 F.3d at 963. See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 61. Appling, 848 F.3d at 961. 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 63. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(i) (defining the term “insider” to include a relative or general 
partner of the debtor). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). 
 66. § 523(a)(2)(A), supra note 62. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Appling, 848 F.3d at 956. 
 69. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). 
 70. Appling, 848 F.3d at 957. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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excepting fraudulently incurred debts from discharge serves to 
discourage debtor fraud.73 Others argue that regardless of whether the 
fraud exception actually deters debtor fraud; dishonest debtors do not 
deserve the benefit of the discharge.74 Under this theory, the fraud 
exception is retributive and operates as a civil penalty for moral 
wrongdoing.75 A second purpose of the fraud exception focuses on the 
innocent reliance of the creditor instead of the debtor’s waywardness.76 
In other words, the fraud exception is based on the premise that the 
creditor who extends credit based on misinformation or fraudulent 
information provided by the debtor should be protected.77 
To summarize, the rationale for the fraud exception is supported by 
two concerns: (1) punishing the wrongdoing debtor for his behavior; and 
(2) protecting the interests of innocent creditors wronged by the debtor’s 
fraud. 
III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION: IN RE APPLING 
In 2017, the Eleventh Circuit considered an important issue regarding 
the dischargerability of a debt acquired through fraudulent means.78 
Specifically, the question was whether a statement about a debtor’s 
single asset qualifies as a “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . 
financial condition.”79 The court, acknowledged the circuit split on the 
issue, and rejected to follow the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ 
holdings.80 The court agreed with the Fourth Circuit in holding that a 
statement concerning a single asset may qualify as a statement 
concerning the debtor’s financial condition.81 
A. The Majority Opinion 
In In re Appling, the debtor hired the law firm Lamar, Archer, & 
Cofrin (Lamar) to represent him in litigation against the former owners 
of his business.82 By March 2005, Appling owed the creditor, Lamar, 
 
 73. Symposium, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform: Discussion, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 123, 169 (1977). 
 74. Barry Zaretsky, Intent to Repay, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1073, 1091 (1977). 
 75. Id. 
 76. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1997–1978). ?? 
 77. Id. 
 78. Appling, 848 F.3d at 955. 
 79. § 523(a)(2)(A), supra note 62. 
 80. See generally In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676. See also In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406, 413–14 (8th 
Cir. 2004); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 706 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 81. See Engler v. Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 82. Appling, 848 F.3d at 955. 
9
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$60,819 in legal fees and became unable to keep current on the bill.83 
During a meeting between Appling and Lamar, Appling stated he was 
expecting a tax refund of “approximately $100,000,” which would be 
enough to pay current and future legal fees.84 Lamar asserts it continued 
to provide legal service in reliance on this statement, and delayed 
collection of Appling’s overdue legal fees.85 Appling received a refund 
of only $59,851 and spent the money on his business.86 In November 
2005, Appling and Lamar met again, and Appling stated he had not yet 
received the refund.87 Five years later, Lamar filed suit against Appling 
and obtained judgment for $104,179; three months later, Appling filed 
for bankruptcy.88 In response, Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding 
against Appling, and the bankruptcy court ruled the debt 
nondischargeable because Lamar justifiably relied on Appling’s 
fraudulent statements.89 The district court affirmed, rejecting Appling’s 
argument that his oral statements “respected his financial condition and 
should have been dischargeable.”90 
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s factual findings 
for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo.91 In determining 
whether Appling’s statements about a single asset are “statements 
respecting [his] . . . financial condition,” the court stated the starting 
point of analysis begins with the language of the statute itself.92 The 
Code does not define the germane terms, “respecting” and “financial 
condition.” Therefore, the court looked to the terms’ contexts to 
determine that they bear a technical sense.93 
The court concluded that “financial condition” likely meant one’s 
overall financial status.94 Elsewhere in the Code, “insolvent” is defined 
as the “financial condition such that the sum of such entity’s debts is 
greater than all of such entity’s property.”95 In this context, the statute 
uses “financial condition” to describe the whole state of being insolvent, 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Appling, 848 F.3d at 955. 
 88. Id. at 956. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Appling, 848 F.3d at 957 (citing Ransom v. FIA Card Services. N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69 (2011) 
(citation omitted)). 
 93. Appling, 848 F.3d at 957-58 (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, 69 (2012)). 
 94. Appling, 848 F.3d at 958. 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A). 
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but never describes any specific asset on its own.96 Relying on the 
premise that “a word or phrase is presumed to have the same meaning 
throughout the text,” the court determined “financial condition” 
references the sum of all assets and liabilities.97 However, the court 
found that the phrase about a statement regarding the debtor’s financial 
condition does not cover only statements that encompass the entirety of 
a debtor’s financial condition at once.98 The phrase “respecting the 
debtor’s . . . financial condition,” when read in context includes a 
statement about a single asset.99 
“‘Respecting’ is defined broadly as ‘[w]ith regard or relation to; 
regarding; concerning.’”100 The court provides the example that 
documents can “relate to” or “concern” someone’s health without 
describing his overall medical history.101 The court also cited the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the phrase “with respect to” in a 
statute to mean “direct relation to, or impact on.”102 Furthermore, the 
court interpreted “respecting” in the First Amendment to include any 
partial step toward the establishment of religion.103 Ultimately, a 
statement about a single asset “relates to” or “impacts” a debtor’s 
overall financial condition, and knowledge of one asset or liability is a 
partial step toward knowing whether the debtor is solvent or 
insolvent.104 
Lamar rejected the focus on the word “respecting” as “nothing more 
than a game of semantics,” and that the term is merely a grammatical 
device needed to connect two related terms.105 The court, however, 
rejected this argument, contending that judges have a responsibility to 
interpret the whole text, and “[s]ometimes the canon [of ordinary 
meaning] governs the interpretation of so simple a word as a 
preposition.”106 A statement about a single asset is still a statement 
respecting a debtor’s financial condition.107 
Lamar argued that the legislative history often used “financial 
statement” instead of “statement respecting debtor’s . . . financial 
condition,” and should thus be read to apply only to financial 
 
 96. Appling, 848 F.3d at 958. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting “Respecting,” Webster's New International Dictionary 2123 (2d ed. 1961)). 
 101. Appling, 848 F.3d at 958. 
 102. Id. (citing Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992)). 
 103. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Appling, 848 F.3d at 958 (citing Scalia & Garner, supra 93, at 71). 
 107. Id. 
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statements.108 The court disagreed with this argument as well, making 
clear that if Congress’ intent was to say “financial statement,” they 
would have written exactly that.109 The surplusage cannon supports the 
court’s determination that “statement” should be given its ordinary 
meaning, instead of the technical meaning discussed by Lamar.110 Under 
this rule of interpretation, there is a presumption that the legislature put 
every word into the statute for a reason, and it should consequently not 
be interpreted in a way that renders a word superfluous.111 In subsection 
(B), the statute says “use of a statement in writing.”112 Because a 
financial statement is most often a written document, interpreting the 
statute to only cover financial statements would render the writing 
requirement surplusage.113 
Despite spending the majority of the opinion discussing the proper 
interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A), the court stated, “[b]ecause the text 
is not ambiguous, we hold that ‘statement[s] respecting the debtor’s . 
. . financial condition’ may include a statement about a single 
asset.”114 As a policy matter, the requirement that certain statements 
be issued in writing encourages accuracy and predictability in 
bankruptcy disputes that often arise years after the facts develop.115 
Lamar argued the court’s interpretation is a “giant fraud loophole,” 
but both the Uniform Commercial Code and Statute of Frauds 
support the conclusion that the law often requires that proof be in 
writing as a prerequisite for a claim of relief.116 Though the result 
seems harsh towards creditors, it provides them an incentive to put 
agreements into writing so that courts will have reliable evidence 
upon which to make a decision.117 In regards to a fraudulently 
incurred debt, a lender concerned about protecting his rights in 
bankruptcy can easily require a written statement from the debtor 
before extending credit.118 This decision strikes a reasonable balance 
between the “conflicting interests” of discouraging fraud and 
 
 108. Id. at 959. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. See Scalia & Garner, supra 93 (If possible, every word and every provision is to be given 
effect. None should be ignored. None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence). 
 111. William N. Eskridge et al., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 687 (5th ed. 
2007). 
 112. § 523(a)(2)(B), supra note 69. 
 113. Appling, 848 F.3d at 959. 
 114. Id. at 960. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Appling, 848 F.3d at 960. 
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allowing the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start.119 The code 
does not unfairly reward dishonest debtors, but instead insists on 
different requirements of proof for different kinds of statements.120 
Because a statement regarding a single asset can be a “statement 
respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition,” and because 
Appling’s statements were not in writing, his debt can be discharged 
under § 523(a)(2)(B).121 
B. Concurring Opinion  
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rosenbaum disagreed with the 
majority’s broad reading of the phrase “statement respecting . . . the 
debtor’s financial condition,” which rewards a lying debtor who 
dishonestly obtains services.122 This result conflicts with the primary 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, which is to provide relief only to the 
honest debtor. However, Judge Rosenbaum believes the broad 
reading better supports congressional intent to give a fresh start to 
only the honest debtor than does a narrow construction of the 
phrase.123 The reason being that the same phrase appears in both § 
523(a)(2)(A) and (B), and it must have the same meaning in both 
subsections.124 Though a narrow interpretation of the phrase in 
subsection (A) seems to further congressional intent to protect only 
the honest debtor, a broad construction of the phrase in subsection 
(B) better agrees with the congressional intent.125 Because the words 
of the phrase in § 523(a)(2)(B) are ambiguous, Judge Rosenbaum 
believes they must be construed with an eye towards congressional 
intent in enacting the Code. 
While the majority believes the phrase “statement respecting . . . 
debtor’s financial condition” is ambiguous, Judge Rosenbaum 
emphatically disagrees.126 Other courts have concluded that the 
phrase refers only to statements about the debtor’s overall financial 
circumstances—which do not include statements about only a single 
liability or asset.127 Among the courts that appear to have understood 
the phrase to have a meaning contrary to the Appling majority is the 
 
 .  
 120. Id. at 961. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 961. 
 123. Appling, 848 F.3d at 961. 
 124. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) and § 523(a)(2)(B). 
 125. Appling, 848 F.3d at 961. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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Supreme Court, though they did not expressly address the meaning of 
the language.128 The Court held that a creditor must show only 
justifiable reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation to be able to 
except the debt under § 523(a)(2)(A).129 In arriving at this conclusion, 
the Supreme Court discussed §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (B)’s references to 
“a statement respecting a debtor’s . . . financial condition” and 
conveyed that the words “financial condition” in § 523(a)(2) prohibit 
exception of discharge “debts traceable to . . . a materially false 
financial statement” as a term of art referring to a statement of net 
worth, not a statement about a single asset or liability.130 Three other 
circuit courts have also concluded the phrase must be narrowly 
construed to refer only to those statements about a debtor’s overall 
net worth, though the courts do not appear to have determined the 
language of the phrase to have an unambiguous meaning.131 
IV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION: IN RE BANDI 
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion in In re Appling, the 
Fifth Circuit held that a representation regarding a single asset, in this 
case, a particular residence or particular commercial property, is not a 
representation regarding “financial condition,” for purposes of 
exception to nondischargeability.132 
In in re Bandi, Becnel was the holder of a $150,000 promissory 
note executed by Bandi on behalf of RSB Companies, LLC (RSB) 
and personally guaranteed by Bandi and his brother.133 Becnel began 
an adversary proceeding against each debtor alleging the debts owed 
to him were non-dischargeable pursuant to §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and 
(B).134 Becnel’s allegations included claims that: (1) the Bandi 
brothers falsely represented that they owned a commercial building; 
(2) Bandi falsely represented that he owned a condominium and 
another residence in New Orleans; (3) the Bandi brothers presented 
him with a fraudulent list of RSB’s accounts receivable; (4) the 
Bandis never intended to repay the loan; and (5) Becnel would have 
never issued the loan if he was aware of the falsified information and 
misrepresentations.135 
 
 128. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
 129. Id. at 77. 
 130. See generally Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995). 
 131. See, e.g., In re Bandi 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2004); 
In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 132. In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 133. Id. at 673. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/8
2019] BANKRUPTCY FRAUD EXCEPTION 865 
The Fifth Circuit’s analysis began with the words chosen by 
Congress. The word “statement” modified by the phrase “respecting 
a debtor’s . . . financial condition,” appears in both sections of § 
523(a)(2). The Supreme Court has described these two subsections as 
“two close statutory companions barring discharge,” the first of 
which relates to fraud “not going to financial condition” and the 
second of which concerns a “materially false and intentionally 
deceptive written statement of financial condition upon which the 
creditor reasonably relied.”136 The Supreme Court seemed to equate a 
“statement” about “financial condition” with what is commonly 
understood as something akin to a balance sheet or bank balance.137 
They relied upon the legislative history of § 523(a)(2)(B) regarding 
“the peculiar potential of financial statements to be misused not just 
by debtors, but by creditors who know their bankruptcy law”138 
Ruling in favor of the debtor, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
phrase “a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial 
condition” as used in § 532(a)(2) was meant to embody the terms 
commonly understood in commercial use instead of a broadly 
descriptive phrase meant to capture any and all misrepresentations 
that relate to a debtor’s assets or liabilities.139 A representation that 
one owns a particular residence or particular commercial property 
says nothing about the total financial condition of the person making 
the statement or the ability to repay the debt.140 The property about 
which a representation is made could be entirely encumbered, or 
outstanding unidentified liabilities of the debtor making the statement 
could be more than the value of the property.141 
The court finds support for construing “financial condition” in § 
523(a)(2) to mean the overall net worth of an individual or entity in 
other provisions of the Code.142 The term “financial condition” is part 
of the definition of the term “insolvent.”143 The words “financial 
condition” are used three times to define “insolvent” with respect to 
 
 136. Field, 516 U.S. at 66. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 76–77 (House Report on the Act suggests that Congress wanted to moderate the burden 
on individuals who submitted false financial statements, not because lies about financial condition are 
less blameworthy than others, but because the relative equities might be affected by practices of 
consumer finance companies, which sometimes have encouraged such falsity by their borrowers for the 
very purpose of insulating their own claims from discharge). 
 139. In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). 
15
Miller: Bankruptcy Fraud Exception
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
866 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
three classes of entities.144 
At least two other circuit courts relied on a similar construction of 
the term “financial condition.” The Tenth Circuit similarly looked at 
the definition of “insolvent” in § 102(32) and that definition’s use of 
“financial condition” in construing §§ 532(a)(2)(A) and (B).145 The 
court held that none of the debtor’s statements pertained to her 
“overall financial health” and that they were not statements 
“respecting” her “financial condition” within the meaning of §§ 
523(a)(2)(A).146 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that statements within 
the meaning of that section “are those that purport to present a picture 
of the debtor’s overall financial health.”147 The Eighth Circuit has 
also construed § 523(a)(2)(A) in a way consistent with the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuit’s construction of the provision.148 The court rejected 
the debtor’s argument that the failure to disclose was a statement 
respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition, and held 
that the debt was not discharged.149 
The bankruptcy court found that the misrepresentations made by 
the Bandi’s regarding ownership of a commercial building, 
condominium development, and a residence were intended to convey 
the impression that the two brothers owned valuable real property 
and that their personal guarantees to RSB would be backed by some 
measure of wealth.150 The Fifth Circuit concluded that these 
statements fell far short of representing the Bandi’s respective net 
worth or representing their respective “bank balances.”151 
 
 144. Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(32). 
 145. In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 706–07 (10th Cir. 2005) (In the case before the Tenth Circuit, 
the debtor made false oral representations that she owned residences in two cities, a motel, and antique 
vehicles in order to obtain a loan from an acquaintance). 
 146. Id. at 715. 
 147. Id. at 714 (Further explaining the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning: “We hold that such false 
statements are those that purport to present a picture of the debtor's overall financial health. Statements 
that present a picture of a debtor's overall financial health include those analogous to balance sheets, 
income statements, statements of changes in overall financial position, or income and debt statements 
that present the debtor or insider's net worth, overall financial health, or equation of assets and liabilities. 
However, such statements need not carry the formality of a balance sheet, income statement, statement 
of changes in financial position, or income and debt statement. What is important is not the formality of 
the statement, but the information contained within it—information as to the debtor's or insider's overall 
net worth or overall income flow.”). 
 148. In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406, 413 (8th Cir. 2004) (debtor had represented that future payments 
for the balance of the purchase price for limited partnership interests would be funded from a joint 
venture interest in a particular nursing home. The debtor did not disclose that at the time these 
representations were made, the nursing home has been sold). 
 149. Id.  
 150. In re Bandi, 683 F.3d at 678. 
 151. Id. (quoting Field, 516 U.S. at 76). 
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V. STRICT CONSTRUCTION 
The conclusion that an interpretive method lies at the heart of 
disputes among the Justices in Code cases is inescapable.152 Although 
bankruptcy experts might prefer that the Court take a substantive, 
policy-oriented view of the Code, the Court likely would prefer 
simply to view the Code as a statute subject to accepted interpretive 
rules.153 The Justices will likely decide In re Appling, principally 
focused on statutory construction with bankruptcy policy being a 
secondary concern. 
As Gebbia-Pinetti’s empirical research suggests, the Court has a 
tendency to apply a textual interpretation when faced with circuit 
splits concerning ambiguous language.154 None of the Justices are 
bankruptcy experts and the reality is that they are forced to review 
bankruptcy cases because there is no other forum for resolving circuit 
splits. One potential problem with applying a predominately textual 
interpretation is the lack of harmony in future bankruptcy cases, 
especially in circuit courts. With this knowledge, future circuit courts 
faced with appeals based on ambiguous language of the Code might 
have a tendency to apply a similar interpretive method, and 
consequently, the policy of the Code will play a secondary role. 
The structure of § 523 supports the strict interpretation of 
“financial condition.” According to the statute, statements respecting 
the debtor’s financial condition are treated differently under the fraud 
provision than under the § 523(a)(2)(B) false written statement 
provision. Under the strict approach, in which a statement about 
specific assets does not constitute a statement about financial 
condition, a debt attained by such a statement is possibly 
nondischargeable. If the statement was not concerning a financial 
condition, then the false written statement provision would not apply. 
It would be reasonable for the statute to allow a debtor who orally 
misrepresented his overall financial condition to discharge a debt 
because the debtor might accidentally exclude relevant information 
when listing assets out loud. When focusing on a specific piece of 
property, it is unlikely a debtor would forget or misspeak. Similarly, 
it is unlikely a debtor who itemizes his or her entire financial 
condition in writing would make a similar error. If the term were 
interpreted broadly, a debtor who made an oral misrepresentation 
 
 152. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the 
Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 101 (2000), 
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol3/iss1/7/. 
 153. Id. at 103. 
 154. See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 152, at 97, 119. 
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about his interest in any item of property would be able to discharge 
the debt through bankruptcy. However, a debtor who misrepresented 
property ownership in writing would not be able to discharge the debt 
under the false written statement provision, assuming the other 
conditions of the provision are satisfied. Unlike the strict 
interpretation, this reading of the statute is not as logical or consistent 
with the purpose of the statute. 
Public policy supports the strict interpretation of “financial 
condition” in the fraud exception. This construction protects creditors 
by barring debtors from discharging debts acquired through fraud or 
misrepresentation. When construed broadly, “[v]irtually any 
statement concerning an asset or liability arguably relates to financial 
condition.”155 Consequently, the fraud exception to discharge could 
easily be avoided and debtors can escape the anti-discharge provision 
entirely. This sort of behavior would be in disagreement with the 
longstanding policy of not permitting debtors who engage in fraud to 
discharge their debts through bankruptcy.  
Adopting the broad interpretation, as the Eleventh Circuit did, has 
negative public policy consequences. Simply put, someone who 
acquires money or property through fraud or deception should not be 
able to escape liability for his or her wrongdoing. Additionally, 
dishonest debtors should not be rewarded for their fraudulent 
misrepresentations, which would occur if they were allowed to 
discharge fraudulently obtained debts. The broad interpretation 
would permit many dishonest debtors to avoid the consequences of 
oral fraud. The better rule decides cases on their merits, rather than 
on the construction of an ambiguous statutory phrase that grants a 
fresh start without regard to the honesty of the debtor. Potential 
creditors may hesitate to issue loans, knowing that even if potential 
debtors deceive them, it will be difficult to object to discharge. 
Therefore, if the broad interpretation were widely accepted, it would 
have a chilling effect on lending. Creditors would make less loans, 
and even honest debtors would not be able to obtain financing as 
readily. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court does not apply a single interpretive method in 
its Bankruptcy Code cases. Although data reveals individual Justice’s 
interpretive tendencies, such data also reflects that none of the 
 
 155. In re Alicea, 230 B.R. 492, 502 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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Justices have joined exclusively textual or non-textual opinions.156 
Textualists occasionally find enough ambiguity to consult sources 
other than the text, and even the non-textualists occasionally find the 
text to be so plain that no reference to other sources is appropriate. 
Some Justices lean toward textualism while others lean away from it. 
The Justices’ diverse interpretive preferences cause many of the 
Court’s split decisions in bankruptcy cases and contribute to the 
sense that the Court has no coherent interpretive strategy.157 
The § 523 fraud exception is a critical provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code, especially in the context of Chapter 7 filings and the idea of 
the fresh start for the honest debtor. In cases in which a debtor 
fraudulently obtains financing from a creditor, it is reasonable that 
the debtor should bear the brunt of the harm created. The text of the 
Code, however, should not be construed in such a manner as to 
conjure meaning it does not explicitly allow. For the reasons 
summarized in this Article, the Supreme Court should apply a strict 
construction of § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B) and avoid unnecessarily 
broadening the language of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 
 156. Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 152, at 119. 
 157. Id. 
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